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Abstract 
This contribution describes general concepts for control and safety systems in 
proton therapy. These concepts are illustrated by concrete examples 
implemented in the Proscan facility at Paul Scherrer Institut (PSI). 
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1 Introduction  
Protons have successfully been used for many years in the treatment of cancer. Their physical properties 
allow a better conformation of the dose to a target volume, which (depending on the tumour location) 
can give protons an advantage over conventional radiation therapy with photons. 
When preparing a radiation therapy a therapy plan is created that designates the region in the 
patient to be treated and the dose to be applied. This plan is then translated into a steering file containing 
the machine information for the treatment facility. It is the task of the therapy control system to make 
sure that the treatment follows this prescription. The patient safety system supervises the treatment, 
detects dangerous situations and if necessary interrupts the treatment. 
This article describes general concepts for proton therapy control and safety systems, illustrating 
them using examples from the proton therapy facility at Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI). 
2 Proton therapy at PSI 
PSI operates the Proscan facility for proton therapy [1]. The layout of the facility is shown in Fig. 1. 
The proton beam is produced by the superconducting 250 MeV cyclotron COMET. A degrader at the 
exit of the cyclotron reduces the beam energy according to the therapeutic requirements. The beam is 
then sent into four treatment rooms. 
The OPTIS treatment room is dedicated to the treatment of ocular tumours (mostly melanoma). 
It uses a conventional scattering technique to apply the required dose. With this technique patients have 
been treated at PSI since 1984. The installation is an upgrade of the original facility and started operation 
in 2010. 
Gantry 1 went into operation in 1996 as the world’s first spot-scanning gantry that applies the 
dose by magnetic scanning of a focused pencil beam. It aims at the treatment of deep-seated tumours, 
many of them some kind of brain tumour. 
With Gantry 2, PSI continued the technological development of magnetic pencil beam 
scanning [2]. It is based on the experience with Gantry 1 and is optimized for fast and advanced scanning 
modes, allowing the extension of treatment indications. Patient operations started in 2013. 
The most recent treatment room Gantry 3 is currently under construction. Unlike the other rooms 
which were built by PSI, it is a commercial device based on Varian Medical System’s ProBeam system. 
Treatment of patients is scheduled to start in 2017. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Layout of the Proscan facility beamlines including the new Gantry 3 area. The existing treatment areas are 
Gantry 1, OPTIS 2 and Gantry 2. 
3 Control systems 
3.1 Machine control system 
The machine control system (MCS) groups together all the subsystems necessary to control the 
accelerator and the beamline. Its purpose is to deliver a beam with modifiable beam energy, momentum 
spread and intensity to the treatment area. 
The MCS can be based on a framework such as EPICS1. Access to the equipment under control 
is provided through Versa Module Eurocards, so-called VME modules, housed in several crates 
distributed over the Proscan facility. Each VME crate is equipped with a single-board computer called 
input output controller (IOC). These IOCs can be accessed over the network using the EPICS concept 
of channels by other applications or user interfaces. 
The MCS provides a graphical user interface (GUI) running on workstations located both in the 
central control room and at each treatment room. Write access from these workstations is restricted 
during therapy. 
Communication between a treatment area and the MCS is organized through the beam allocator 
gateway (BALL). Besides providing an interface to the MCS, BALL restricts write access to MCS-
controlled devices in order to prevent interference from different areas during therapy.  
3.2 Machine protection 
The purpose of the machine protection system (at PSI called run permit system (RPS)) is to protect the 
beamlines and the accelerator from damage by the proton beam. It defines limits for the setting of 
devices in the beamlines, e.g. an upper and a lower limit for the current in magnets along the beam line. 
If the current setting is outside of these limits, the beam cannot be switched on. If the beam is on when 
a violation of the supervised limits occurs, it is switched off. The RPS has its own independent interface 
to a set of final elements for this purpose. 
                                                     
1 EPICS is a software framework for experimental physics and industrial control systems. 
The limits used by the RPS depend on the treatment area that requests the beam. The RPS is 
informed by the MCS which treatment area is requesting the beam and then sets the limits accordingly. 
3.3 The concept of mastership 
During treatment of a patient only one area can have full control over the facility, and no other area is 
able to interfere. Based on the planned therapy flow, one area requests exclusive access, called 
mastership, to the beamline from BALL. If available, BALL grants mastership, giving exclusive access 
to both the shared and local beamline sections all the way upstream to the cyclotron. This includes 
control of the degrader (energy selection) and the kicker magnet (beam on/off control). The requesting 
area becomes ‘master’ and the patient treatment scheduled in this area can be performed. 
3.4 Therapy control system 
The therapy control system (TCS) consists of two components, the therapy delivery system (TDS) and 
the therapy verification system (TVS). 
TDS and TVS run on IOCs in separate VME crates. These crates contain (besides the IOCs) the 
necessary modules to interface with the actuators and sensors used to perform the treatments, and with 
the other control system parts (see Fig. 2). 
Proceeding spot by spot, the TDS initiates the setting of the actuators to control the beam position 
(the two sweeper magnets, the patient table, the gantry motors and the beamline) and sets the required 
dose for the spot to be applied. When all preparations are successfully completed, the command to 
switch on the beam is issued. 
The TVS checks that the spot sequence proceeds as planned. It verifies the correct setting of the 
actuators by means of dedicated sensors (e.g. Hall probes to check the field of the sweeper magnets; 
position encoders to check the positions of the patient table and gantry body). In addition, it performs a 
number of checks before, during and after the spot application (e.g. verification of the dose applied and 
of the spot position). 
In case of a failure, the TDS and TVS can interrupt the treatment by generating an interlock. Both 
TDS and TVS use individual steering files which contain definitions of the dose and of the nominal 
values for actuators and sensors for each spot.  
The user interface to the TCS consists of two applications: the GUI server, communicating with 
TDS and TVS over the network, and the GUI client, communicating with the GUI server over the 
network. There may be more than one instance of the GUI client running at a time. The GUI server 
guarantees that only one GUI client has write access to the TCS. 
The proton dose is monitored by ionization chambers. The primary (dose-defining) monitor is 
located just upstream of the patient. Additional monitors in the treatment room and along the beamline 
supervise the correct function of the primary monitor and serve for additional safety functions (e.g. 
interrupting the treatment when beam intensity becomes too high). 
 
Fig. 2: Simplified scheme of the therapy control system (TCS) with its interface to associated control systems and 
the GUI server and clients. PaSS signals are failsafe connections (three-wire current loop), digital signals are I/O 
signals like TTL, or serial, parallel and network connections. 
4 Patient safety system 
4.1 Principle 
The purpose of the patient safety system (PaSS) is to protect the patient from radiation hazards by 
minimizing the risk for an uncontrolled irradiation. 
The PaSS follows the principles of any safety system: 
• sensors measure critical parameters; 
• a logic evaluates the data provided by the sensors and decides if the ongoing (therapy) process 
should be interrupted; 
• final elements reach the safe state (no beam, stop of mechanical motion). 
The PaSS is implemented with logic hard coded in electronic chips and using only point-to-point 
connections, avoiding the use of communication buses. Reflecting the architecture of the Proscan 
facility, the PaSS has local and central parts (schematically shown in Fig. 3): 
• the local PaSS for a specific treatment area, with its own sensors, logic and final elements; 
• the central PaSS for those parts of the facility that are used by all treatment areas, with sensors, 
logic and final elements that must be shared between treatment areas.  
 
 
Fig. 3: General architecture of the patient safety system with local and central components, each containing several 
modules. This figure is largely simplified: the single wires shown in the figure are in reality multiple hardware, 
point-to-point connections. Inputs to the PaSS (from sensors directly and from control systems) are not shown.  
4.2 Final elements 
Several final elements allow us to switch off the beam to prevent uncontrolled irradiation. Both 
redundancy and diversity are required. At PSI the following elements are used (see also Fig. 3 for their 
location). 
4.2.1 Kicker magnet AMAKI 
The kicker magnet AMAKI is the fastest device dedicated to turning the beam on and off. If the magnet 
is energized, it deflects the beam into a beam dump. AMAKI was primarily designed as a steering 
element for spot scanning. Due to its fast reaction time and its ability to handle many on/off cycles in 
an extremely reliable way, it also has the function of a safety element. A magnetic switch is used to 
supervise the magnetic field of the AMAKI. Reaction time for AMAKI is 300 µs. 
4.2.2 High-frequency generator  
The high-frequency (HF) generator of the cyclotron can be used as final element in two stages: the 
power can be reduced to 80% (HF_RED)—this already stops acceleration of protons completely but 
prevents cooling down of the generator, which can lead to beam instabilities. In a second stage the 
generator can be completely switched off (HF_OFF). Reaction time for both stages is 400 µs. 
4.2.3 Ion source 
Powering off the ion source at the centre of the cyclotron prevents protons entering the accelerator 
(IQ_OFF). Reaction time for the ion source is 20 ms. 
4.2.4 Local fast mechanical blocker 
At the entrance point of the proton beam into the treatment room a fast mechanical beam blocker 
(BMB2) is installed. It is a block of 10 cm copper which can be moved in or out of the beamline by 
pressurized air and a mechanical spring. In case of failure of the pressurized air it will fall into the beam-
blocking position by gravity. Reaction time for the local fast mechanical blocker is 60 ms. 
4.2.5 Local slow mechanical blocker 
Located in the local part of the beam line, but still upstream of the treatment room, is a slow mechanical 
blocker (BMB1) made of graphite. It can be moved in or out of the beam line by pressurized air. In case 
of failure of the pressurized air it will fall into the beam-blocking position by gravity. Reaction time for 
the local slow mechanical blocker is 1 s. 
4.2.6 Central slow mechanical blocker 
Located near the exit of the cyclotron is a slow mechanical blocker (BMA1) made of graphite. It can be 
moved in or out of the beam line by pressurized air. In case of failure of the pressurized air it will fall 
into the beam-blocking position by gravity. Reaction time for the central slow mechanical blocker is 1 s. 
4.3 The beam switch-off functions 
The beam switch-off can have two different functions. 
• A control function: the TCS controlling the dose application switches the beam off when the 
specified dose has been applied. 
• A safety function: a potential radiation hazard is detected and the PaSS switches the beam off. 
Depending on the risk associated with the radiation hazard and the source of the hazard, three 
different interlock levels have been defined. They are labelled ALOK, ATOT and ETOT (see 
Fig. 4) 
4.3.1 Beam switch-off control function 
The beam switch-off control function is used during regular operation to terminate the spot once the 
nominal dose has been reached. At PSI this is realized by energizing the kicker magnet AMAKI, the 
primary final element. 
Since in spot scanning the dead time between the single dose element applications needs to be 
kept below a few milliseconds, the regular beam switch-off control function does not trigger any 
mechanical beam blockers to be closed. 
4.3.2 ALOK beam switch-off safety function 
If a problem with any equipment of the local beamline occurs which might cause a radiation hazard, an 
ALOK is raised. An example is an unexpected beam position. 
In the presence of an ALOK, the safe state, i.e. beam off, is achieved by the activation of the 
following final elements: 
• the fast local beam blocker is closed (BMB2); 
• the kicker magnet is energized (AMAKI). 
The correct reaction to an ALOK is supervised. If one or several monitoring functions do not 
respond within the defined timeout, the ALOK is escalated to the next interlock level ATOT. Reasons 
which can lead to an escalation are: 
• AMAKI status not changed after timeout; 
• BMB2 not closed after timeout; 
• nozzle dose monitors measure beam after timeout. 
4.3.3 ATOT beam switch-off safety function 
If a problem originating from a device in the shared beamline occurs and could cause a radiation hazard 
or if an ALOK was escalated, an ATOT is raised. This happens for example when, after a beam switch-
off command from the TDS, the beam current does not reach zero within the specified time limit. 
In the presence of an ATOT, the following final elements are activated: 
• the local slow beam blocker is closed (BMB1); 
• the central slow beam blocker is closed (BMA1); 
• the cyclotron HF generator power is reduced to 80% (HF_RED). 
The correct reaction to an ATOT is supervised. If one or several monitoring functions do not 
respond within the defined timeout, the ATOT is escalated to the next interlock level ETOT. Reasons 
which can lead to an escalation are: 
• BMA1 not closed after timeout; 
• BMB1 not closed after timeout; 
• HF power not reduced after timeout; 
• beam line dose monitors measure beam after timeout. 
4.3.4 ETOT beam switch-off safety function 
In case of a high-risk radiation hazard, the ETOT (emergency interlock) signal is raised. This happens 
when: 
• a person operates a mechanical emergency-stop button; or 
• beam is detected in a treatment area which is not master; or 
• an ATOT was escalated. 
In the presence of an ETOT, the following final elements are activated: 
• the cyclotron HF generator is powered off completely (HF_OFF); 
• the cyclotron ion-source power supply is powered off (IQ_OFF). 
 
Fig. 4: Summary of the final elements used by the regular beam-off command and by each of the safety functions, 
ALOK, ATOT and ETOT. The column to the right shows which of the PaSS components is responsible for 
controlling the respective final element. 
4.4 Shared and redundant access to the common final element subsystems 
With the exception of BMB2, access to the final elements is shared between all treatment areas. This 
access is implemented by the two components of the central PaSS: 
• the main patient safety switch and controller (MPSSC); and 
• the emergency-or module (E-OR). 
The MPSSC implements the following functions: 
• area reservation and mastership validation: 
o only one single slow local beam blocker BMB1 can be open at a time and this only for the 
master area; 
o the mastership setting defined by BALL is cross-checked with direct hardware signals from 
the TCS of the treatment areas; 
• ALOK safety function and AMAKI control: 
o the ALOK function is enabled for the master area exclusively; 
o access to the regular beam on/off command is restricted to the master area exclusively; 
• ATOT safety function: 
o the ATOT safety function is restricted to the master area exclusively. 
Redundantly, the E-OR module implements the ETOT safety functions: 
• HF_OFF; 
• IQ_OFF. 
The E-OR allows all treatment areas to trigger the ETOT function at all times.  
4.5 Implementation 
The PaSS logic is implemented on several XILINX Spartan 2 FPGAs2 (Fig. 5). These FPGAs are placed 
on industry-pack (IP) modules. Each module provides 10 channels (input and output). Hytec 8003 VME 
carrier boards can hold up to four IP modules. The carrier boards provide power to the IP modules and 
an interface to perform resets, set modes and read out the status of the IP modules. A transition board 
on the back side of the VME crate provides connections from the sensors and to the final elements. 
 
Fig. 5: Hardware implementation of the PSI patient safety system: four IP modules are mounted on a VME carrier 
board; the transition module on the right provides connections to sensors and final elements. 
5 Integration of the commercial Gantry 3 
Gantry 3 [3] is the latest extension of the PSI proton therapy facility. As already mentioned in the 
introduction the design is not based on PSI technology but the gantry is built by Varian Medical Systems. 
Obviously Gantry 3 is delivered with its own control system. The challenge for the control system 
integration is to merge two quite different worlds: on one hand Varian’s ProBeam scanning system, on 
the other hand PSI’s existing systems, most of them built in-house. The Varian scanning system needs 
access to the cyclotron, the beamlines and the safety elements to control the beam and to switch it off in 
case of an interlock. 
The chosen architecture leaves most of the existing systems untouched, with newly developed 
interfaces to connect them; see Fig. 6. The Varian system controls the scanning system (scanning 
magnets and dose monitors), the gantry and patient table positioning and the part of the beamline on the 
gantry itself. PSI systems control the upstream part of the beamline, the cyclotron and the central 
components of the PSI safety system. 
The PSI part of the interface consists of two components, the TCS and the PaSS adapters. 
                                                     
2 A field-programmable gate array (FPGA) is an integrated circuit designed to be configured by a customer or a designer 
 
 
Fig. 6: Integration of Gantry 3 into PSI’s control and safety systems is provided by the ‘adapter’ interfaces 
5.1 TCS adapter 
The TCS adapter communicates with the Varian system over a network connection. It serves as a 
gateway to PSI’s machine control system. Typical commands are requests for treatment room 
reservation, beam energy and intensity. It also supervises the correct setting of the energy-selection 
system. It is implemented as a VME system with a Motorola single-board computer running VxWorks. 
5.2 PaSS adapter 
The PaSS adapter constitutes the interface between the Varian (local) and PSI (central) systems. While 
re-using most of the technology from the existing treatment rooms it was decided to program the logic 
on a state-of-the-art platform [4]. The choice fell for the IFC1210 controller, developed jointly by PSI 
and IOxOS [5]. It features a user-programmable Virtex 6 FPGA chip. It contains the safety system logic 
which after system startup is totally autonomous. On board are a further two Power PC CPUs running 
SMP Linux. They provide a standardized EPICS communication interface. This is used by the GUI, 
which provides access to the safety logic and automated actions like logging and statistics. 
A generic platform, the so-called signal converter box (SCB), supports the interconnection of IO 
signals from and to all subsystems. Data exchange between the SCB and the logic controller is handled 
over a high-speed communication link. It was developed jointly by PSI and Supercomputing Systems 
(SCS) [6]. 
For the development of the safety logic the same process as for the existing areas is followed. It 
comprises extensive verification and validation steps to ensure the correctness and integrity of the logic. 
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